One of the buzz phrases or buzz concepts that the United States Military is currently obsessing about is one with the moniker of Information Operations. This is something that we here on the ground in Iraq, or more specifically my unit (a combat unit), got in full force once we touched down in Kuwait prior to our arrival at the current base of operations. Looking back, there was an inkling of it at one of the final briefings that we had stateside.

At this particular briefing, we got an introduction to what Iraq was going to be like from some returning veterans. They talked of the operations that they conducted, what the locals were like, particulars of equipment, strategy, tactics, and the like. Near the end, some staffer from one of the higher headquarters asked how much Information Operations played into what they did on the ground.

Dead silence. The baffled looks from the veterans said it all. They had no idea what was being talked about, let alone practicing this idea. None of us in the audience, except for the staffer, had any idea either.

Once in Kuwait, however, we got an introduction to what that staffer was talking about. Right off the bat, however, the lecturer discredited the idea and himself to my mind. Asking about the definition of what Information Operations could be, he comes to the brilliant conclusion that there is no right definition. What he failed to see, though, was that means that there is no definition, and what cannot be defined cannot be studied in rigor or in a scientific manner. Presenting a theory and resulting doctrine of an indefinable is just downright silly.

He presents a picture with no caption, and asks us what we think is going on. This is driving at the idea he is fumbling with, that is that the media plays a role in what we do, that the images and sound bites control the public opinion and the political masters that pull our leashes.

Finally, we settle on calling Information Operations the act of delivering a message to a designated target to achieve a desired effect. Now we are in the business of advertising? Or spin control? To be perfectly honest, a mortar barrage will do the same thing of delivering a targeted message, only the message is something along the lines of “Tag! You’re it,” “Better duck,” or “You’re dead.”

I love the obsession that American management types have with padding more words into a description in an attempt to hide the fact that they do not have well formed thoughts about a particular concept. Why qualify the target as designated? As opposed to undesignated targets?

Realistically, this could actually be a good conception, of entering a competition of ideas. The vast majority of wars up until the 20th century have been wars on a smaller scale, what is now called Limited Intensity Conflicts. Wars of annihilation, like World War II, are actually the exception. John Nagle in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife explores this distinction, particularly with respect to counter-insurgency by the British and Americans in South East Asia. Realizing that our conception of what defines a war is skewed is something that I argue with my comrades about. To them, this is not a real war. To me, it is, and one more in line with what war is the vast majority of the time. But, as there are no trenches or masses of tanks with the skies darkened by aircraft, this must not be “real.”

This is a subtle and key distinction in the perception of war, and how we prosecute it. War is supposed to be quick, violent, and done with before the next celebrity court case comes on the television in the minds of many people. So, as the war progresses into the fourth, fifth, tenth year, the expectations of what it is supposed to be, or more importantly what it is supposed to not be, are not met and the public’s opinion begins to sink into negativity.

In the perception of the proponents of Information Operations, the insurgency is already doing this vaguely defined thing of Information Operations right now. The play on the media in getting out their messages, the influencing of public opinions, and the resulting political pressure that hampers the ability to prosecute the war effectively. This too is flawed. The insurgency is doing no such thing. Media outlets are naturally friendly to the underdogs, or actively hostile to the interests of the Western Governments. In addition, the lack of met expectations with what a war is supposed to look like makes any continued operations a strong negative, or even indistinguishable from a defeat. The only thing that the insurgency has to do is continue on to make the counter-insurgency appear to fail.

There is no concerted effort by “the insurgency” to engage in a media campaign because the insurgency is fragmented and composed of competing interests. This involves a great deal of sectarian violence as this competition is worked out at the business end of a barrel. There is no Middle Eastern version of General Giap that is a unifying and driving force. Al-Zaraqawi was possibly an influential force, but not nearly a unifying one, nor even the most relevant one prior to his death. In fact, the big success of al-Qaeda is that as an organization, it is able to help one group network with other groups that it would otherwise not be able to contact. This cross-pollination of competing groups may make each interest do more that it would on its own, but we are still left with separate competitive elements. The illusion of the media campaign is because of the media’s inclination to favor that particular element, as in the doctoring of the photos by a Reuter’s photographer, not that there is a concerted effort to present a unified manifesto.

In isolation, each group might be seen to deliver a unified manifesto over the area that it operates, but this is a small cell working in relative isolation. That is more along a political movement a la the likes Mao. The small scale local terrorism, the idea that “power flows from a gun” in enforcing the power structure and mobilizing the population base to support the local politics, these would all be familiar to the leader of the Long March. Local politics and sectarian violence are more Maoist in action and implementation than anything else, the pursuit of security through the elimination of any potential rivals. Last one standing is pretty secure, since everyone else is dead.

From this perspective, the conception that the officer was pushing about Information Operations is more political than anything else. I would posit that American frankly suck as politicians, since we have failed time and time again to understand what it is that motivated the rest of world and drove successful revolutions. Marx, Mao, and Deng: they had a conception of what politics was on a grand scale. They were also masters of violence to enforce the political will of the government. Americans are content with the media frenzy resulting from mudslinging and vague allegations of impropriety, not with the larger ideas that drive movements and color world views. But, to their credit, at least Americans are not fans of settling intellectual disputes with gunfire in the streets and mines in the roadways.

Our officer in the briefing regaled us with ideas of how to deliver the targeted message to get the desired effects. The idea was to build relationships, spheres of influence, and then manage, or at least be aware of, second and third order effects. Great talk, but little to back it up with. On the idea of building relationships, there is the fact that we are there for a finite time, whereas whomever we are engaging has to live there. The second and third order effects will be the results of the local history and existing social relationships. Our waltzing in will have little effect on that, other than to throw a new element into the existing system, possibly causing mistrust, or the perception of favoritism. So, the desire not to pick sides in sectarian issues is derailed by the perception that the Americans are helping one group over another, drawing the forces into local dealings whether or not they want to be. The local leaders engaged will know this, since they have had time to perfect their dealings with the previous commanders of forces in the area. Right of, the sphere of potential influence has been minimized, since the American will leave after his tour is up, to be replaced by another starting from zero.

One of the comments that was posed in the middle of this was that we should learn Arabic. Why? Not just to make an attempt to learn some of the local language and reach out in an effort to build relationships, but to make sure that the interpreters are not double dealing. While it is a well known thing that there are some interpreters that play both sides, this is completely unrealistic. Learning a language, particularly one that is a completely different language family than English, is a difficult proposition. Something that is likely to consume more than a year to master, especially the subtleties needed to pick up on mistranslations or plays on words. It would be easier to rely on others squealing on the dirty players, which is another enigmatic can of worms of varying motives and relationships. To simply state that we should pick up another language like learning to read a map or calling for artillery fire is a gross underestimate of what is involved in building relationships or managing expectations.

There are some good nuggets in this conception, the idea that this is a system of relationships and competing interests. But the current proponents of this dogma are sidetracked with the focus on what CNN is putting on the airwaves. Taking a moment to think carefully about what the situation really is and how to approach it intelligently would pay a lot more dividends, instead of approaching this like a greedy investor to an Enron balance sheet.